Collective Wage Agreements and Adjustments in German Services Firms by Kaiser, Ulrich & Pfeiffer, Friedhelm
ZEW
Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH
C e n t r e  f o r  E u r o p e a n
E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h
Discussion Paper No. 00-33
Collective Wage Agreements and
Adjustments in German Services Firms
Ulrich Kaiser and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
Discussion Paper No. 00-33
Collective Wage Agreements and
Adjustments in German Services Firms
Ulrich Kaiser and Friedhelm Pfeiffer
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von 
neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung 
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other 
economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0033.pdf
Collective Wage Agreements and
Adjustments in German Services Firms
ULRICH KAISER* and FRIEDHELM PFEIFFER**
August 2000
Abstract:
There is a growing concern about collective wage agreement and employment
dynamics in Germany. In this paper, evidence is provided on the way collective
wage agreements affect the adjustment of working hours, employment and other
production factors when firms from the service sector are faced with demand
shocks. The estimation results indicate that collective wage agreements
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11. Introduction
One of Germany's most challenging economic policy problem is its high rate of
unemployment. While a number of European countries such as Denmark, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom have been successful in reducing their
unemployment figures to rates of 4-6 percent, the portion of jobless workers has
risen in Germany to over ten percent. It is often argued that the German labour
market is too inflexible to substantially reduce unemployment rates. Above all,
collective wage agreements are critically discussed in the economics
profession.1
In this paper it is analysed whether collective wage agreements actually
influence firms' use of alternative instruments to adapt to product demand
changes in a significant way. The focus is on the use of dismissals, enrolments,
and on the adjustment of working hours when firms are confronted with demand
variations. Since restrictions in firms' employment policies due to collective
wage agreements may have secondary effects on the use of other instruments
such as temporary employment contracts, subcontracting or price adjustments,
these instruments to adjust to demand changes  are also considered here.
Despite the ongoing public debate on labour market institutions and sluggish
employment dynamics in Germany, empirical evidence on the way collective
influence firms' employment decisions at the level of firms is scarce. A
shortcoming of most of the existing studies on the relationship between labour
market institutions and employment is that they focus on the sector level
although the firm is the place where hiring and firing decisions actually take
place.2 An exception, however, is the contribution by Sadowski et al. (1995)
who analyse the effect of the work councils on the competitiveness of German
firms. The authors find that job turnover and dismissals are lower in firms
where workers are represented by work councils than in firms where a work
council does not exist.3 Another drawback of most existing studies is that a vast
majority is solely concerned with manufacturing industries although in
industrialised countries the service sector nowadays is more important than
manufacturing industries in terms of overall economic significance. Both
shortcomings are overcome in this paper: we analyse the effect of collective
wage agreements for the German business-related services sector using firm-
level data.
                                                
1 See Layard and Nickell (1999) for a critical discussion of alternative institutional labour market settings and
detailed descriptive evidence on international labour markets.
2 For evidence from German sector data see Franz and Smolny (1994), Houseman and Abraham (1995), Kraft
(1989) as well as König and Pohlmeier (1988). For international studies see Hamermesh (1993) and Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999). More recently, the interest of researchers has shifted to the firm-level. Reviews of this
literature are presented by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) and Franz (1999).
3 Note that collective wage agreements have, if they exist, a legal priority over plant-level work agreements. See
Rieble (1996) for a discussion of the German legal system governing the relationship between employers and
employees.
2From an economic point of view the distinction between economic and
institutional determinants of costs and their consequences for labour demand at
the micro and the macro level is at the heart of the debate on labour market
flexibility in Germany. Institutional arrangements like collective wage
bargaining and employment protection laws can raise labour costs and the costs
of adjusting working hours and employment to levels which hampers firms'
employment dynamics. Our data set, the `Service Sector Business Survey´
(SSBS),4 a quarterly business survey in ten business-related services sector
provides an ideal database for the study of institutional adjustment costs on
labour dynamics for at least three reasons: first, business-related services is a
fast growing sector of the German economy. In West Germany, the number of
employees in business-related services grew by 88 percent between 1982 and
1996 (Kaiser et al., 2000). The business-related services sector therefore
accounted for roughly six percent of total employees in West Germany in 1996.
It now is of almost equal importance as the banking and insurance sector in
terms of employment. Second, service firms differ markedly from
manufacturing firms in their ability to adapt to demand shocks: production to
stock is infeasible for them while it is a widely applied tool in manufacturing
industries. Therefore, collective wage agreements should have a more direct
effect on labour demand in services than in manufacturing. Third, compared to
the manufacturing sector, there is a relatively low diffusion of collective wage
agreements in the business related service sector. According to calculations on
the basis of the SSBS survey of summer 1999, on average only 38 percent of
total sales in the business-related services sector is realised by firms bound to
collective wage agreements (see Table 1). For reasons of comparison, Table 1
also contains the coverage of employees in collective wage agreement
calculated from the Institute for Employment Research's (IAB) establishment
panel for 1998 (Bispinck, 1999, p. 10; see also Bellmann et al., 1999). In West
Germany, collective wage agreements cover 67.8 percent of the employees, in
East Germany 50.5 percent. In the service sector, the overall coverage is 55.2
percent in West Germany and 45.6 percent in East Germany.
The figures from the SSBS and the IAB establishment panel are not directly
comparable since the SSBS figures are related to sales while the IAB figures are
related to the number of employees. It clearly is nevertheless indicated that the
diffusion of collective wage agreements is lower in the service sector than in the
total economy. It is very low in most of the fast-growing business related
services sectors. One reason for the below-average validity of collective wage
agreements in the business-related services sector as displayed in Table 1 (e.g.,
in tax consultancy it is 4.5 %) is that explicit collective wage agreements do not
                                                
4 The SSBS is collected by the ZEW in co-operation with Germany's largest credit rating agency Creditreform
since June 1994. Business-related services in Germany are defined by Klodt et al. (1997) by enumeration of the
following sectors (see Table 1): (1) computer and related activities, (2) tax consultancy, (3) management
consultancy, (4) architectural activities, (5) technical consultancy, (6) advertising, (7) renting of automobiles,
(8) renting of machinery, (9) cargo handling and storage and (10) sewage and refuse disposal.
3exist in many of these sectors.5 Another reason is that the share of highly skilled
labour in business-related services is up to four-times as large than that of
manufacturing industries (33.2 % vs. 8.7 %, Pfeiffer and Falk, 1999). Compared
to skilled workers (‘Facharbeiter’) university graduates are less likely to be
union members (Fitzenberger et al. 1999). According to the econometric results
in Section 5, the negative relation between firms' share of highly skilled labour
and the probability that it applies collective wage agreements is confirmed for
the German business-related services sector.
Table 1: Share of Firms Applying Collective Wage Agreements
Business-related services (SSBS,1999): as percentage of total sales
sales share
Tax consultancy 4.5
Advertising 13.4
Vehicle rental 16.2
Management consultancy 22.3
Architectural activities 25.8
Computer & related activities 29.7
Machine rental 37.2
Techn. consultancy 41.1
Cargo handling 73.6
Sewage disposal 74.0
Business-related services (total) 37.9
Business-related services (East Germany) 37.7
Business-related servcies (West Germany) 37.9
Selected sectors (IAB establishment panel, 1998): as percentage of total
West Germany East Germany
Total 67.8 50.5
Other services 55.2 45.6
employment share
German unions currently undergo a process of reorganisation and structural
change. In order to increase their influence in the German service sector, they
plan to unify five individual unions into a single service union called `verdi´
which will presumably have more than three million members.6 The foundation
conference is scheduled to take place in March 2001. If the unions are actually
successful in increasing their economic relevance, the diffusion of collective
wage agreements will rise in the future. The question then arises is whether
                                                
5 Firms are allowed to adopt collective wage agreements of other sectors, which, however, is rarely the case.
6 For more information, visit the verdi website at http://www.verdi-net.de/.
4such a development will have consequences on labour demand in the service
sector, both in the short and in the long run.
Main results of this paper are that collective wage agreements induce firms to
react in an asymmetric way to product demand shocks. Firms applying
collective wage agreements significantly less often hire additional labour and
free-lance collaborators to cope with demand fluctuations than firms not bound
to such contracts. The probability of short-term employment contracts is
positively affected while collective wage agreements have no impact on
dismissals. Additional adjustment costs which are imposed on the change of
employment and hours of work by collective wage agreements are presumably
responsible for these results.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces a framework for discussing
the influence of collective wage agreement on the adjustment of hours,
employment and other instruments of firms faced with demand variations and
surveys the literature. Section 3 describes the econometric model and Section 4
introduces the data. Section 5 presents estimation results and Section 6
concludes.
2. Adjustment costs, collective wage agreements and
    labour demand
Economic and institutional adjustment costs
If firms' reality could be best described by the standard economic textbook
model of perfect competition on in- and output markets, then optimal
adjustment of all input factors would take place instantaneously. It has long
been recognised that this in fact is not the case (see Hamermesh, 1993). The
demand for labour and other factors usually adjusts more slowly than the
demand for firms' output. Adjustment costs smooth the time path of inputs. The
larger the cost of adjusting input factors is, the slower will the adjustment of
inputs on average be if firms are faced by product demand shocks. Firms tend to
hoard labour in recession phases and/or use overtime work or inventories of
goods to cope with rising demand. In the service sector, the use of inventories,
however, is limited. The service of architects, consultants or vehicle renters
cannot be stored. This characteristic of services therefore reduces the flexibility
of firms to variations of input factors.
In labour demand theory, two broad categories of costs are defined: variable and
fixed costs (Hamermesh, 1993). Variable costs vary with the amount of labour
employed, fixed costs do not change. The functional form and the composition
of fixed and variable labour costs and other factor costs determine the
adjustment costs of changing labour and thereby the dynamic path of working
5hours, employment and other inputs factors in reaction to demand fluctuations
(see Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Both types of costs can be influenced by
economic factors, for example rising energy prices or changes in the skill
composition of labour supply, and institutional arrangements like collective
wage agreements, employment protection laws or work councils. In Germany,
workers can be represented by a work council at the firm level and by unions at
the sector level, which has been called the ”duality of workers representation”
(see Sadowski et al., 1995). While work councils have a strong legal position
with respect to dismissals and hours of work, collective wage agreements
(bargained between unions and employer's associations or unions and single
firms) have, however, a legal priority over plant-level arrangements (bargained
between work councils and firms or between workers and firms) (see Rieble,
1996).
The distinction between economic and institutional determinants of costs and
their consequences for labour demand is important for the debate on labour
market flexibility. Institutional arrangements can raise fixed costs to levels
which might hamper employment dynamics. Furthermore, collective wage
bargaining might result in a wage structure which is not compatible with full
employment (for a more detailed discussion on the German experience, see
Fitzenberger and Franz, 1999). Economic factors may also result in high and
rigid levels of fixed and variable costs. Informational theoretic reasons for
example might lead to efficiency wages. Hence, it is not the absolute
importance of institutional adjustment costs that matters but its relative or
differential importance and its interplay with economic adjustment costs.
Economic fixed costs can arise due to employee-specific human capital which
result from the individual employer-employee relationship. A fraction of these
costs like search and other enrolment costs have to be borne before the worker
actually is employed, another fraction is generated during the relationship by,
e.g., employee training. Institutional costs may result from the German system
of employment legislation in general, and, more specifically, from collective
wage agreements. The latter ones determine specific infrastructure investments
for handicapped persons, safety provisions for workers and the costs of
dismissing a worker. In Germany, dismissed workers are entitled to
compensation payments which depend on tenure and family status
(‘Kündigungsschutzgesetz'’, see Houseman and Abraham, 1995). Firms which
apply collective wage agreements in addition often accept special employment
protection rules that rule out for example dismissals of older employees caused
by rationalisation. The adjustment of hours might also induce specific costs,
which can depend on statutes formalised in a collective wage agreement. Many
agreements include paragraphs which restrict the amount of overtime work
and/or determine the level of additional overtime pay (see Bispinck, 1999).
6Fixed costs associated with an adjustment of employment and working hours
arise during the entire length of the employee-employer relationship, whether
they originate in economic or institutional reasons. It follows that wages at
times will be lower than the worker's marginal product of labour and that
economic shocks must be larger to lead firms to adjust the higher the adjustment
costs. A brief discussion of Farber's (1999) illustrative model is helpful in
capturing the key concepts and costs in the adjustment of employment and in
deriving testable hypothesis for the empirical analysis.7 Let Y denote the total
value of the specific human capital inherent in the individual match between an
employer and an employee. The firm has to pay to the worker a wage W of
(1) W=Wa+λY,
where Wa is the worker's outside wage and the wage the firm would have to pay
in the case of enrolments. λ can vary between 0 and 1 and denotes the
employee’s share of the value of the specific capital. The value of what the
worker produces is
(2) V=Wa+Y+φ,
where φ denotes a random variable with mean zero which influences the value
of the employment relationship. The variable represents economic shocks which
stem, for example, from demand fluctuations or from changes in input prices.
Subtracting the wage rate W from V leads to firm's profit with respect to the
individual employee-employer relationship:
(3) Π=V–W=Wa+Y+φ –Wa–λY=(1–λ)Y+φ.
From (3) it follows that firms lay off workers as a result of a demand shock if
(4) φ< –(1–λ)Y,
that is, if the profits out of the individual employee-employer relationship are
negative. Note that the outside wage Wa cancels out. Dismissals as a result of
demand fluctuations are more likely the larger λ or the lower the value of the
specific capital inherent in the employee-employer relationship is. In the SSBS
data, one observes to what extend dismissals or enrolments are applied by firms
in order to react to demand changes. If dismissals (enrolments) are used by the
firm, the profit generated by the laid off worker is negative (positive). Equation
(4) captures the nature and the effect of adjustment costs on layoffs and
enrolments, whether they origin in economic or institutional factors, in an
instructive way.8 This relationship is helpful in deriving testable hypotheses on
firm behaviour and in organising the empirical part of the study.
                                                
7 For space reasons, the argumentation is restricted to the demand side. For a discussion of supply side effects see
Farber (1999) or Franz (1999). The empirical model (see section 3 and 4) implicitly takes into account both
demand and supply side effects by controlling for observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity. Note also that
the issue of adjustment costs is not restricted to labour and can be discussed in a comparable way for capital or
other input factors as well.
8 For structural models of collective wage bargaining in Germany see Fitzenberger and Franz (1999).
7Testable hypothesis on the impact of collective wage agreement on employment
policies in firms
The gains from an employer-employee match (equation 4) depend on the degree
of competition on in- and output markets, on the degree of substitution between
labour and capital and, in the case of heterogeneous labour, on the degree of
substitution between different skill levels and on other working conditions,
which stem from labour market institutions. Collective wage agreements in
Germany can influence λ and/or Y in different ways. Collective wage
bargaining in Germany is not restricted to wages only. Working conditions such
as specific employment protection rules and restrictions in hours of work are
part of the negotiation and might enhance the value of λ and/or Y. Collective
wage agreements are the results of bargaining between a union and an employer
association or between an union and a single firm. The agreement therefore is in
the interest of the signing employer association and unions and the results of
negotiation typically will contain compromises in case of conflicting interests
between bargaining parties.9
In what follows it is assumed that employed workers and their unions are
interested in stable, long-term employer-employee relationships for their
members. More stable employment relationships might on average be also in
the interest of successful firms applying collective wage agreements. A larger
value of Y and/or a smaller value of λ is helpful in achieving the goal of long-
term employee-employer relationships of the workers employed in the face of
variations in demand. Training at the workplace for example can raise the value
of V. Evidence from international empirical studies on the determinants of
work-related training supports this view. In firms where unions have more
influence - which likely is the case if firms participate in collective wage
bargaining -, the individual likelihood of participating in work-related training
is larger than in firms which do not apply collective wage contracts (see
Pfeiffer, 2000).
As a consequence of applying collective wage agreements, the employer-
employee relationship in firms applying collective wage agreements will, under
the further assumption that shocks are not specific to firms applying collective
wage agreements, be more stable on average than in firms not applying
collective wage agreements. Economic shocks have c.p. to be larger in firms
                                                
9 German basic constitutional law (‘Grundgesetz’) allows the creation of coalitions (‘Koalitionsfreiheit’, Article
9). Workers can bundle their interests in unions and bargain with firms. Alternatively is possible to leave the
union and bargain individually. From a legal point of view, firms participating in collective wage agreements
only have to apply the results of the collective bargaining process to workers who are members of the
bargaining union. This, however, does not create problems for the empirical analysis below since in Germany
firms actually apply the outcome of collective wage agreements to all of their workers (see Fitzenberger and
Franz, 1999). It therefore does not make a difference if an individual worker in a firm applying collective wage
agreement belongs to the union or is not a union member.
8participating in collective wage agreement than in other firms to lead firms to
adjust labour. Hence, our first hypothesis is that firms applying collective wage
agreement have a lower probability of using the instrument of enrolments when
confronted with (positive) demand shocks (see Table 2). If λ and/or Y is higher
due to collective wage agreements, than the positive shock which leads to
enrolments has to be larger in these firms compared to other firms.
A symmetric argument does not necessarily apply to dismissals and negative
demand shocks. On the one hand, it is true that negative demand shocks must be
larger for firms applying collective wage contracts before they dismiss workers.
On the other hand, for firms applying collective wage agreements, the values of
λ and/or Y might be more rigid downwards than in other firms. Downward
flexibility might counteract negative shocks at least to some degree. If in firms
which are not bound to collective wage agreement the values of λ and/or Y are
more flexible downwards,10 the employment consequences of negative shocks
might be dampened. In recent times, collective wage agreements in some
sectors contain hard-ship clauses, which allow firms to reduce wages in case of
negative economic developments (see Bispinck, 1999). Hard-ship clauses are
more often contained in collective wage agreements in East than in West
Germany. The firm's work council has to agree upon the application of a hard-
ship clause. There is, however, no empirical evidence of the application of hard-
ship clauses to date. Summing up, our hypothesis with respect to dismissals is
not as clear-cut as the one related to enrolments. Collective wage agreements
may have positive or negative impacts on dismissals. In fact, work councils
might also have a differential influence on firms' employment policies. The
SSBS, however, does not contain information on work councils.
Firms use more than just the instruments of dismissals and enrolments to adapt
to demand changes. They may alternatively or additionally use the following
instruments which are observed in the SSBS: (1) overtime/short-time work, (2)
life-long working schemes, (3) temporary employment contracts, (4)
subcontract orders, (5) free-lance collaborators and (6) price adjustments. These
instruments may be influenced by collective wage agreements either in a direct
way such as overtime work and life-long working schemes or in an indirect way
such as temporary employment contracts, free-lance collaborators or price
adjustment which are not part of the wage bargaining.
Our hypotheses with respect to the influence of collective wage agreements on
the use of these instruments shall be briefly illustrated (see Table 2). Unions
have an interest in reducing working time (without pay losses) and the amount
of overtime work since that may result in more stable employment relationship
                                                
10 There are economic reasons as well that labour adjustment as a result of positive or negative shocks is not
symmetric (see Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Therefore the sources of downward rigidities of wages remains
an empirical question.
9for their members.11 Hence, our hypothesis is that firms which apply collective
wage agreements less frequently use overtime/short-time work as a reaction to
demand changes.12
Given that unions are interested in durable employer-employee relationships, it
seems likely that they favour life-long working hours schemes. This is enforced
by a tendency in collective wage agreements to reduce overtime pay and to
increase the flexibility of hours arrangements, which is in the interest of firms.
Our hypothesis is that firms applying collective wage agreements have a higher
probability of using life-long working hours schemes than firms not applying
collective wage contracts.
Table 2: The expected signs of the impact of collective wage agreements
on firms’ use of alternative instruments for coping with demand
fluctuation
Instrument Expected sign
Enrolment -
Dismissal -/+
Overtime/short-time -
Life-long working schemes +
Temporary employment
contracts
+
Free lance contractor -
Subcontracting +
Price adjustments 0
Temporary employment contracts are not subject to collective bargaining
rounds. Therefore the influence of collective wage agreements on the use of
temporary employment contracts is of secondary nature. Such working contracts
are likely to be applied if firms are uncertain about the lasting nature of a
product demand shock. Since firms which are bound to collectively bargained
wages and hours agreements have a higher need for flexibility, it is
hypothesised that collective wage agreements have a positive effect on the use
of temporary employment contracts.
Subcontracting orders to other firms is another flexible instrument for firms to
react to demand changes, which is not part of collective wage bargaining. If
                                                
11 Whether employment rises as a consequence of a reduction of the amount of overtime work, however, depends
among others on the technology of the firm, on wages and on demand side conditions (Franz, 1999). König
and Pohlmeier (1988) and Kraft (1989) found that a reduction in working times actually slightly reduced
employment for manufacturing industries.
12 From a theoretical point of view the effects of collective wage agreements on overtime and short-time work
may differ. Because of data limitations we are unfortunately not able to separate these effects.
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firms applying collective wage agreements are restricted in the adjustments of
labour and working hours, subcontracting orders also should be used relatively
more often by firms bound to collective wage agreements. Although the same
reasoning holds for free-lance workers (`freie Mitarbeiter´) - which is in fact
nothing but a special form of subcontracting from an economic point of view -,
we nevertheless hypothesise that the probability of the use of this instrument is
lower for firms bound to collective wage agreements. In Germany there has
been a debate about the emergence of "false'' self-employment since several
years.13 Since self-employed workers cannot be union members, we hypothesise
that collective wage agreements have a negative effect on the use of free-lance
workers if faced by demand shocks.14
The last instrument analysed is price adjustment. If collective wage agreement
and non-collective wage agreement firms operate on comparable markets, the
impact of collective wage agreement on the use of price adjustments should be
zero. The empirical results therefore could be understood as a test of the
assumption that applying collective wage agreements is not related to price
setting power on product markets.
3. Microeconometric approach
The employer-employee specific profit Y(1-λ) for the firm (see equation (4))
cannot be observed in the SSBS data. The condition for firing and hiring
workers as stated in equation (4) can, however, be translated into a latent model,
where the use of enrolments due to demand shocks is represented by a latent
variable. In the SSBS data, the extent to which firms use alternative instruments
to adjust to demand fluctuations are reported on an ordinal five-point scale. An
ordered probit model therefore is an adequate device for the econometric
analysis.
From the theoretical reasoning it followed that firms' application of dismissals
and enrolments are determined by the relative magnitudes of Y(1-λ) and the
demand shocks. The values Y(1-λ) are determined by the firms' technology, the
price elasticity of product demand, the degree of competition on the product
market, input prices, and skill composition as well as by institutional factors
such as collective wage agreements. Some of these factors, like the skill
structure and collective wage agreements, are observed in the SSBS data,
                                                
13 See Dietrich (1998). A worker is said to be false self-employed if she or he is doing work which usually is
done by employees. Workers and firms might have an incentive for false self-employment to save taxes and
contributions to the social security systems. The German government enacted more stringent rules to hamper
the development of false self-employment in order to stabilise regular employment in 1999.
14 Unions are aware that subcontracting orders to firms which are not bound to collective wage agreements are a
way of surrounding collective wage agreements. Therefore one goal of unions is to expand the validity of
collective wage agreements also to subcontracting firms.
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others, like the price elasticity of demand and technology, are not available. In
the econometric model observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity is taken
into account by including a set of control variables and by capturing random
firm-specific effects.
It is assumed that the observed variable Zi – in the present case, firm i's ordinal
use of enrolments etc. –  takes on the value l if a latent variable Zi* lies in
between the boundaries µl-1 and µl, where l=1,...L and L denotes the total
number of values the observed variable Zi takes on.15 The latent variable Zi* is
assumed to be linearly related to a set of explanatory variables, summarised in
the column vector xi, by a column vector β and an i.i.d. normal distributed error
term νi: Zi* =xi'β+νi.16 Comparisons of the estimated vector of coefficients, βˆ ,
across different ordered probit models are infeasible due to the identification
problem in qualitative dependent variable models.17 For three possible states,
e.g., non-application of enrolments (Zi=0), occasional application of enrolments
(Zi=1), and application of enrolments (Zi=2), the relationship between the latent
variable Zi* and the observed variable Zi can be summarised as:
(5)
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i.e., firms indicate that they often apply enrolments (Zi=2) if the latent value Zi*
exceeds the critical value µ2. In this case, the latent variable can be regarded as
the intensity of firms' enrolments which is transferred by the interviewee to an
ordinal scale. The inclusion of the variables for observed firm heterogeneity
such as firm size and sectoral affiliation and the inclusion of firm size dummies
is equivalent to allowing the thresholds µ to vary dependent on observable firm-
specific factors. If, as in the present case, xi includes a constant term, one
threshold has to be normalised in order to yield identification.18 Without loss of
generality µ.1 = 0 is chosen. The probability to observe Zi taking on the value 0,
1 or 2, conditional on the set of explanatory variables xi, is:
                                                
15 For the extreme values, Zi=0 and Zi=L, the related boundaries are µ0=−∞  and µL=∞ .
16 Note that the normality assumption is a weak one since "(...) shifting the boundaries can make ordered probit
fit any multinomial distribution'' (Hausman et al., 1992, pp. 325-326).
17 The standard error of the disturbance term, σ, is not identified so that the elements of the estimated parameter
vector are all scaled by σ.
18 Alternatively, identification is also obtained if the thresholds are be set to some arbitrary value and the
specification includes a constant term both in the conditional variance and in the conditional mean.
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here σ denotes the standard error of the disturbance term νi which  is usually,
s in the present application, normalised to one. The formulation of the ordered
robit model as in equations (5) to (7) can be extended to panel data
pplications in a straightforward way. In the SSBS, each firm i is observed one
o four times. The latent variable associated with an ordered panel data model,
it*, where the subscript t denotes the point in time at which firm i is observed,
s now given by Zit*=xit'β+υit. The error term υit is specified as the sum of two
omponents: υit=εit+αi. αi is assumed to be a time independent individual-
pecific random variable, reflecting unobserved firm heterogeneity, while εit is
ssumed to be an error term which is independent both across individuals and
cross time. Both error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with zero
eans. In order to yield identification of the model, the standard error of εit, σε ,
s normalised to one. Hence:
[ ] 2 2 21itar v ε α ασ σ σ= + = + ( )
2
' '
2
and   with .
1
itCorr v t t
α
α
σρ
σ
  = = ≠  +
he parameter 2ασ  has to be estimated.19 The relevance of the panel structure,
hat is, the difference between the full (random effects) and the restricted
pooled) model, is tested.
                                               
9 The derivation of the corresponding likelihood-function is discussed for example by Greene (1997, ch. 19.8)
Hamerle and Ronning (1995) discuss the random effects ordered probit model in greater detail. All
estimations were run using the software package LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene, 1995).
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4. Data
The data are taken from the ZEW Service Sector Business Survey (SSBS). The
SSBS is a random sample, stratified with respect to ten service sectors as well
as with respect to regional affiliation (East/West Germany) and firm size. The
ZEW has been sending out a one-page questionnaire every three months to
about 3,500 firms belonging to the business-related services sector since the
second quarter of 1994. Over the past six years, the response rate has remained
quite constant at around 30 percent.20 The survey is constructed as a panel, e.g.,
the same firms are repeatedly sent a questionnaire. The questionnaire is divided
into two parts. In the first part, firms are asked to indicate on a three-point
Likert scale whether their sales, prices, demand, profits and number of
employees have, in the respective previous quarter, either increased, remained
unchanged, or decreased. Moreover, they are asked to give an assessment of the
five indicators for the coming quarter. The second part of the survey deals with
economic and political issues of interest, some of them are repeated on an
annual basis. Our analysis is based on the SSBS data related to the fourth
quarters of 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, e.g., to waves 11, 15, 19 and 23 of the
SSBS. The ZEW has been annually asking about the extent to which firms use
instruments to adapt to demand changes in the respective fourth quarters since
1996. It was allowed for multiple responses. The responses range from `not
applied at all´ to `very often applied´ on a five-point Likert scale.
Table A1 in the Appendix displays descriptive statistics on the distribution of
answers across the alternative instruments in each wave. Overtime/short-time
work is by far the most often applied method to adjust to demand changes. In
1999, 43.9 percent of the firms apply overtime/short-time work. Life-long
working hours schemes on the other hand are comparably seldom used. 60
percent of the firms do not apply them at all. Temporary employment contracts,
subcontracting and free-lance employment are both either applied or often
applied by roughly a quarter of firms. Around 18 percent applies enrolments
and eleven percent applied dismissals. While 43 percent of the firms never
apply dismissals as an instrument to cope with demand fluctuations, only a
quarter never applies enrolments. Price adjustments are applied by 17 percent of
the firms in the sample. While the time pattern of the use of most instruments
seems to be rather stable, the number of firms applying enrolments has risen
between 1996 and 1999, which indicates the dynamic nature of this sector of the
economy. The figures confirm results found in the literature that the adjustment
of hours usually is more often used than the adjustment of employment
(Hamermesh, 1993). Price-adjustment and life-long working hours schemes are
less often applied while subcontracting and temporary employment contracts is
a quite common instrument. The variety of instruments used indicate firms'
                                                
20 Details on sample stratification and the calculation of expansion factors are presented in Kaiser et al. (2000).
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effort to gain flexibility. If some instruments are restricted by law, economic
forces or institutions for whatever reason, this might have consequences for the
use of these and the other instruments.
The information on whether firms apply collective wage agreements is taken
from the 21st wave of the SSBS (2nd quarter of 1999), i.e., collective wage
agreements are treated as a time-invariant variable. It includes firms which
apply collective wage agreements voluntary or as a member of the employers'
association. It is not restricted to central wage agreements
(‘Flächentarifvertrag’) only and also includes firms which directly bargain with
unions (‘Firmentarifvertrag’). The German Ministry of Labour can declare
centrally bargained wages and other working conditions as legally binding for
all firms in special sectors (‘Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung’). In the ten sectors
analysed in the SSBS there currently are no such binding declarations. Roughly
62 percent of the business-related services firms in our sample negotiate wages
between employers and employees, that is without unions. Among them, 87.6
percent negotiate individual wage contracts.
It is assumed that firms which were bound to collective wage agreements in the
21st wave also applied collective wage agreements in the previous and later
waves used in this study, i.e., waves 11, 15, 19 and 23. According to recent
evidence by Bellmann et al. (1999) more than 90 percent of firms applying a
collective wage agreement in 1995 (1996) also applied collective wage
contracts in 1996 (1997) in West Germany. Furthermore, it was found that firms
which exited collective wage agreements in some year, often returned to the
application of collective wage agreements in later years. In East Germany, the
fluctuation in the application of collective wage agreements has been somewhat
larger than in West Germany. One can therefore not exclude the possibility that
there are firms in the SSBS sample which did not apply a collective wage
agreement in 1999 but did so in previous years, and vice versa. However, by
keeping in mind that entry and exit into or from collective bargaining is modest,
the potential errors-in-variables-problem should be rather small.
The empirical model assumes that the extent to which the instruments are used
to cope with demand variations is determined by (for descriptive statistics, see
Table A1 in the Appendix):
(1) The validity of a general wage agreement. This is a dummy variable which
is coded one if the firm is bound to a general wage agreement. The variable
is denoted by COLLWAGE.
(2) Labour force composition. Information collected in the SSBS-waves 16, 18
and 20 is employed to calculate the share of high skilled (university and
polytechnics graduates) and low skilled (workers with no formal
qualification) labour in firms' total employment. The share of highly skilled
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labour is denoted by SHAREhigh, the share of low skilled labour is denoted by
SHARElow. There is evidence that adjustment costs for high skilled labour are
larger compared to low skilled labour (see Hamermesh, 1993). On the one
hand, one therefore might expect that firms with a large share of high skilled
labour are more reluctant to change the number of employees when faced by
demand variations than firms with a large share of low skilled labour. On the
other hand, overtime work should be more common when the share of highly
skilled labour is larger. Since firms are only asked whether they use
enrolments or dismissals and not what types of skills are mainly affected, the
study can only give qualitative rather than quantitative assessments.
(3) Expected, current and lagged demand changes. Since adjustments of the
labour force are costly, one can expect that firms only adjust their workforce
if they have been successively faced by changes in product demand.
Therefore expected, current and lagged demand changes are introduced in
the empirical model. One should expect that positive demand changes have a
positive impact on labour demand and overtime work while a negative effect
shows up for dismissals. The variables are constructed from the first part of
the questionnaire, the lagged values are calculated from the related previous
waves. Information on demand changes is provided on a three-point ordinal
scale. Dupt is coded one if increased demand is present (and zero otherwise)
and Ddownt is coded one if decreased demand is realised (and zero
otherwise). The subscript t denotes the point in time to which the demand
change corresponds. The lag length has been tested with likelihood-ratio
tests so that the number of lagged demand changes included in the final
specification differs across the estimations.
(4) Firm size. The adjustment of the labour force will presumably depend on
firm size. Collective wage agreements can contain special small firm clauses
which allow smaller firms to pay lower wages (Bispinck, 1999). The effect
of firm size on employment and working hours adjustment is ambiguous. On
the one hand, large firms may tend to both dismiss and hire workers more
often than small firms, especially when the fixed part of the adjustment costs
is large. On the other hand, the relationship between workers and
management may be closer in small compared to large firms which may have
an offsetting effect on labour demand. If the number of employees is small,
adjustment patterns might in addition be different due to indivisibilities. In
small firms, the decision to employ an additional worker might significantly
influence the values Y(1-λ) of the incumbent workers. The value of Y(1-λ)
for an additional employee might therefore be rather small when demand
fluctuations are considered. Firm size is considered by the inclusion of five
dummy variables which denote the size categories less than six (SIZE<6),
between six and 20 (SIZE6-20), between 21 and 50 (SIZE20-50), between 51
and 100 (SIZE50-100), between 100 and 200 ( SIZE100-200), and more than
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200 (SIZE>200) employees. The second size class is the most densely
populated one and serves as the base category.
(5) Bewilderment by demand variations. BEWILDER+ and BEWILDER++
take on the value one if the related firm states that it is affected or strongly
affected by demand fluctuation, respectively. One can expect that, due to the
existence of hiring and firing cost, firms are reluctant to adjust the labour
force if affected by slight demand fluctuations only. Therefore , the effect of
these two variables should be positive on enrolments and overtime work for
example.
In order to control for further observable firm heterogeneity, the following set
of variables is included in addition: (i) sector-specific influences are considered
by nine sector dummy variables, technical planning serves as the base category;
(ii) a dummy variable for East German firms (East Germany) and (iii) three
wave-specific dummy variables Wave11, Wave15 and Wave23 which take on the
value one if the related observation was taken from the 11th, 15th or 23rd SSBS
wave, respectively. Wave19 is the base category.
Due to unit and item non-response, the econometric analysis employs an
unbalanced panel econometric approach in order to retain as much information
as possible. The largest sample is the one related to the decision to subcontract
orders and to temporary employment contracts as a reaction to demand
variations. The corresponding estimates are based on 1,254 observations and
576 individuals. The figures for price adjustments, life-long working schemes,
overtime/short-time work and free-lance employment are of similar size. Due to
the inclusion of lagged demand changes, the number of observations and
individuals for enrolments are lower. Although all questions on the extent to
which the various instruments to adapt to demand changes are used are asked
and answered on a five-point scale, the extreme category `very often applied' is
very thinly occupied in the case of dismissals and price adjustments. They both
contain less than five percent of the observations (see Table A1). Following
Blundell et al. (1993) the categories `often applied' and `very often applied' are
combined into a single category often/very often applied'.
5. Estimation results
Economic and institutional determinants of firms employment and price
policies
The results of the unbalanced random effects ordered probit models are
presented in Table 3. Table 3 part one contains the estimation results for
enrolments, dismissals, overtime/short-time work and for life-long working
hours schemes, Table 3 (continued) displays the results for temporary
employment contracts, subcontracting, free-lance work, and price adjustment.
The estimations differ in the number of observations and the goodness of fit as
17
measured by the pseudo R² (Aldrich and Nelson, 1989) which ranges from
0.0657 for the enrolments equation to 0.1608 for the price adjustment equation
and which is quite convenient for those kinds of models. The standard deviation
of the random effects, σα, is significantly21 larger than zero in all models.
Likelihood ratio tests of the random effects model (full model) against the
pooled model (restricted model) indicate that the presence of random effects
cannot be rejected at the one percent significance level in all specifications.
Taking the panel structure into account therefore leads to efficiency gains. The
threshold parameters µ are estimated with a high precision and are significantly
different from one another in all equations.
The estimates confirm the influence of collective wage agreements on firm
flexibility. Institutional factors have a significant effect on labour dynamics in
German services firms. There are direct and secondary impacts of collective
wage agreements as well. Neglecting institutions which change adjustment
costs and policies of firms therefore will lead to purely specified empirical
models of dynamic labour demand in Germany. Economic factors are important
as well. Demand expectations, current and lagged demand changes, the skill
structure and firm size influence firms use of alternative instruments.
The findings regarding the effects of collective wage agreements on firms use
of instruments as a reaction to demand variations can be summarised as
follows:22
(i) the probability to hire additional labour and free-lance workers
significantly decreases if firms are bound to collective wage agreements,
(ii) the probability to apply overtime/short-time work decreases if collective
wage agreements are applied; the effect is, however,  only weakly
significant (p-value .10),
(iii) the probability for temporary employment contracts and life-long
working schemes significantly increases if firms apply collective wage
contracts and
(iv) the probabilities for dismissals, price adjustments and subcontracting do
not differ across firms bound to collective wage agreements and those
firms not applying collective wage contracts.
Hence, the empirical results indicate that firms which follow general wage
agreements tend to be more reluctant to hire additional labour when faced by
demand variations than those firms which are not bound to general wage
agreements. Collective wage agreements seem to hamper firms' tendency to
adjust to demand variations by using free-lance workers and seem to foster
                                                
21 Given the number of observations and individuals, we regard a significance level below five percent as
`significant' and a level of five to ten percent as `weakly significant'.
22 All estimations have been performed in a restricted sample without the two sectors where collective wage
agreements are very common (cargo handling and sewage disposal). The estimation results remain
qualitatively the same and are thus not presented here.
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temporary employment contracts, which is in line with the hypotheses
developed in Section 2. The application of collective wage agreements has
neither a measurable influence on firms price setting behaviour nor on
dismissals. The hypothesised positive impact on subcontracting has been
rejected. Policy implications are discussed in the last section of this paper.
The other results capturing economic instead of institutional factors shall be
briefly summarised. The coefficients corresponding to expected, lagged and
current demand changes are in line with what could be expected a priori: for
short-run instruments, such as overtime/short-time work, subcontracting, free-
lance working and price adjustment, mainly current demand changes matter. For
the longer-term instruments such as enrolments and dismissals, expected and
lagged demand changes play a significant role as well. The demand change
variables are jointly significant at the five percent significance levels in all of
the specifications with the exception of life-long working hours schemes. This
latter finding indicates that life-long working hours schemes are intended to
generally achieve more flexibility in working hours and employment.
Skill composition is important for the use of instruments to adapt to demand
changes as well. Larger shares of low skilled labour significantly enhances the
probability of dismissals and of temporary employment contracts. Larger shares
of high skilled labour significantly enhances the probability of free lance
workers and reduces the probability of price adjustments. The skill structure
surprisingly has no significant impact on the use of enrolments and
overtime/short-time. Firm size jointly matters in all but the subcontracting
estimation, the price adjustment and the life-long working schemes equations.
Firm size has a U-shaped effect on enrolments as well as on dismissals. Larger
firms (size class 100 to 200 employees) use enrolments, dismissals, temporary
employment contracts and over/short-time work more often than smaller firms.
This indicates that employment flexibility is lower for very small compared to
larger firms as one theoretically could expect if adjustment costs do not vary
with the number of workers.
East German firms do significantly differ from their West German competitors
in the use of the various instruments to adjust to demand changes. Their
propensity to dismiss workers and to adjust prices is significantly higher than
that of West German firms. The reverse is true for free lance workers. The
sector affiliation dummies are jointly significant for all models. If firms are
affected by demand changes to a higher degree (BEWILDER+, BEWILDER++)
than dismissals, subcontracting and price adjustments occur with a higher
probability.
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Table 3: Economic and institutional determinants of firms employment
and price policies
Life-long working
Schemes
Over/short/
time
Dismissals Enrolments
COLLWAGE 0.391**         0.16 -0.230*          0.14 -0.117           0.14 -0.327**        0.14
East Germany 0.252*           0.15 -0.490            0.13 0.446***       0.14 -0.087            0.12
Wave 11 -0.196            0.14 0.177             0.11 0.659             0.12 -0.005            0.12
Wave 15 0.099             0.13 0.886             0.11 0.495             0.12 -0.038            0.12
Wave 23 0.041             0.12 0.135             0.10 -0.764            0.11 0.086             0.11
SIZE<5 -0.467            0.27 -0.672***      0.18 0.178             0.21 -0.338 *         0.20
SIZE 6-20 -0.174            0.13 -0.122            0.12 -0.133            0.11 -0.560***      0.14
SIZE50-100 -0.092            0.18 0.127             0.15 0.239             0.18 0.115             0.17
SIZE100-200 0.107             0.21 0.492***       0.19 0.451**         0.21 0.418**         0.22
SIZE>200 0.160             0.26 0.396 *          0.22 0.505**         0.24 0.243             0.21
SHAREup -0.082            0.25 0.105             0.22 -0.346            0.24 0.205             0.23
SHARElow 0.133             0.26 -0.172            0.19 0.403**         0.21 0.233             0.23
BEWILDER+ 0.205*           0.11 0.130             0.10 0.176*           0.11 0.128             0.11
BEWILDER++ 0.137             0.15 0.134             0.12 0.421***       0.14 -0.039           0.14
∆ D+t+1 -0.047           0.11 0.309***       0.12
∆ D-t+1 0.202            0.13 -0.179           0.13
∆ D+t 0.278***      0.10 -0.137           0.11 0.190             0.12
∆ D-t -0.781          0.12 0.494***      0.13 -0.215            0.15
∆ D+t-1 -0.150**      0.07 0.290***       0.11
∆ D-t-1 0.150**       0.07 0.059             0.12
Std. err. of random effect
σα 1.143***          0.09 1.005***       0.07 0.961***      0.08 0.807             0.09
LR-tests for joint significancy
Sectoral dummies 19.410** 31.164*** 24.032*** 30.216***
Wave dummies 5.918 3.256 2.164 1.508
Size class dum. 5.828 25.600*** 16.400*** 36.764***
Skill shares 0.512 1.220 7.658** 4.605
Bewildern. dum. 3.450 2.240 9.888*** 4.605
Demand dummies 11.246*** 46.874*** 10.640***
Pseudo-R2 and # of obs.
Pseudo-R2 0.133 0.123 0.096 0.066
# of obs. 1,237 1,249 1,244 992
# of individuals 572 579 573 482
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Table 3: continued
Temporary
employment contract
Free-lance workers Price adjustments Subcontracting
COLLWAGE
0.319** 0.144 -0.409*** 0.16 0.157 0.119 0.099 0.134
East Germany
0.105 0.15 -0.338*** 0.14 0.417*** 0.111 0.105 0.140
Wave 11 -0.215* 0.13 0.020 0.14 0.077 0.115 0.232** 0.111
Wave 15 0.170 0.13 0.129 0.13 -0.132 0.110 0.303*** 0.116
Wave 23 0.061 0.12 -0.153 0.11 0.058 0.098 -0.109 0.104
SIZE<5
-0.639*** 0.22 0.577 0.24 -0.154 0.171 -0.096 0.202
SIZE 6-20
-0.173 0.13 0.113 0.13 0.039 0.125 0.294*** 0.123
SIZE50-100
0.250 0.18 -0.056 0.17 -0.033 0.132 0.003 0.163
SIZE100-200
0.416** 0.21 0.094 0.22 -0.020 0.177 0.402** 0.208
SIZE>200
0.729*** 0.21 0.332* 0.21 0.217 0.183 0.200 0.209
SHAREup
-0.120 0.27 0.997*** 0.25 -0.376** 0.196 0.295 0.223
SHARElow
0.867*** 0.24 0.393 0.25 -0.065 0.203 0.184 0.232
BEWILDER+
-0.127 0.11 0.023 0.11 0.165* 0.096 0.188** 0.099
BEWILDER++
0.273* 0.16 0.227 0.14 0.392*** 0.128 0.387*** 0.129
∆ Dupt+1 -0.048 0.13 0.099 0.13 0.193 0.114 0.224 0.148
∆ Ddown-t+1 -0.079 0.12 -0.025 0.13 0.017 0.109 0.233** 0.106
∆ Dupt -0.004 0.12 0.179* 0.10 -0.087 0.105 -0.238* 0.131
∆ Ddownt 0.057 0.16 -0.096 0.15 0.101 0.123 0.102 0.108
Std. err. of random  effect
σα 0.975*** 0.08 1.090*** 0.08 0.766 0.07 1.083*** 0.07
LR-tests for joint significancy
Sector. dum. 34.528*** 125.826*** 42.756*** 87.032***
Wave dum. 10.238** 61.722*** 5.392 21.964***
Size class dum. 30.214*** 64.008*** 2.992 11.516**
Skill Shares 14.188*** 73.318*** 3.726 2.032
Bewilder. dum. 6.864** 56.730*** 10.596*** 9.576***
Demand dum. 0.574 61.600*** 4.642 14.458***
Pseudo R2  and # of obs.
Pseudo R2 0.089 0.154 0.161 0.143
# of obs. 1,254 1,250 1,236 1,254
# of  individ. 576 578 579 576
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimation of the random effects ordered probit model based on an unbalanced
sample of services firms from the SSBS 1996 to 1999, 4th quarter. The specification also includes nine sector
dummies. ***, **, * variable or groups of variables is significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Determinants of applying collective wage agreements
The empirical analysis concludes by uncovering factors explaining firms'
propensity to apply collective wage agreements. A binary probit model for the
probability that a firm applies collective wage agreements is estimated based on
the 1999 sample of the SSBS. Sector dummies, firm size, skill mix, and firm age
are included as explanatory variables. Table 4 displays coefficients, marginal
effects and the respective standard errors of the probit estimate.
Sectoral affiliation is a major determinant of the application of collective wage
agreements. The larger the share of high skilled labour and the smaller the share
of low skilled labour, the smaller is the probability that a firm applies collective
wage agreements. Firm age has a U-shaped, although insignificant, effect on the
likelihood of applying general wage agreements. Firm size has a positive impact
on the adaption of collective wage agreements. Summing up, the results indicate
that the determinants to apply collective wage contracts in the business-related
services sector are similar to those for the whole economy (see Bellmann et al.,
1999). There is, however, one exception: in our study, East and West German
firms do not differ in the application of collective wage agreements from one
another. This is probably due to the fact that the business-related services sector
lacks union tradition in both East and West Germany which goes along with
lower attachments to collective wage bargaining.
Table 4: Determinants of applying collective wage agreements
Coeff. Std. err. Marg. eff. Std. err.
Computer & rel. act. -0.1366 0.2761 -0.0411 0.0798
Tax consultancy -1.2269 *** 0.4229 -0.2473 *** 0.0436
Management cons. 0.0016 0.2908 0.0005 0.0908
Architectural act. -0.1254 0.3097 -0.0377 0.0895
Advertising -0.5074 0.3353 -0.1339 0.0719
Vehicle rental 0.1361 0.4149 0.0443 0.1403
Machine rental 0.4238 0.3433 0.1472 0.1292
Cargo handling 0.7995 *** 0.3153 0.2903 *** 0.1233
Sewage disposal 0.6657 *** 0.2808 0.2364 *** 0.1079
East Germany -0.0220 0.1757 -0.0068 0.0545
SIZE5-49 -0.4889 *** 0.1920 -0.3417 *** 0.0981
SIZE>99 0.6607 *** 0.2284 0.2887 *** 0.1153
SHARE
high
-1.0954 *** 0.3187 -0.1579 *** 0.0633
SHARE
low
0.9254 *** 0.3680 0.2299 *** 0.0851
Age -0.0075 0.0186 -0.0023 0.0058
Age² 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
Constant -0.1972 0.3572
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimation probit model estimation based on SSBS data from 1999, 2nd quarter. ***
variable is significant at the 1 percent level.
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6. Conclusion
The paper analyses the effect of collective wage agreements on the adjustment
of working hours, employment and other input factors. Collective wage
agreements might impose additional cost to the adjustment of labour, which
may lead to more sluggish employment dynamics. Although the relationship
between institutions and labour demand is particularly important for policies
designed to create employment, empirical evidence is scarce at the firm-level.
Our study is concerned with firms from the fast growing German business-
related sector.
Our econometric findings indicate that collective wage agreements significantly
decrease the probability of enrolling additional labour and of using
overtime/short-time work, when firms are confronted with demand variations.
Collective wage agreements also decrease firms' probability to hire free-lance
workers. They significantly increase the use of temporary employment contracts
and of life-long working hours schemes. We do not find significant effects on
the application of dismissals, subcontracting and price adjustment. It has been
further shown that enrolments are a widespread instrument for service firms to
cope with demand fluctuations.
These results are based on qualitative rather than on quantitative information so
that it cannot be inferred, e.g.,  how many workers are hired or dismissed due to
positive or negative demand shocks. Our estimations results, however, indicate
a significant impact of collective wage agreements on firms' employment
policies. The transmission mechanism between collective wage agreements and
firms employment policies nevertheless remains partly a black box and has to
be investigated in greater detail for at least three reasons.
First, the influence of work councils could not explicitly be taken into account.
Since work councils have a strong position as workers’ representatives in issues
related to employment and working hours, it is likely the case that work
councils also have differential effects on firms' employment policies. Sadowski
et al. (1995) find that the existence of work councils leads to less labour
turnover within firms. Second, labour lawyers often point at the legal flexibility
potentials already available in collective wage contracts (see Rieble, 1996). For
example, collective wage agreements contain opening clauses, hardship clauses,
lower tariffs for the formerly unemployed etc.. It therefore remains an open
research question whether collective wage agreements are too inflexible per se
or whether firms do not exhaust the range of legal possibilities for other
reasons. One reason for not exhausting labour law might be the cost associated
with actually exhausting labour law. Since the German labour law is complex
its correct application presumably is costly. Third, the analysis is concerned
with short-run labour dynamics. For a policy assessment of collective wage
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bargaining institutions, long-term implications are of course relevant as well. If
collective wage agreements stabilise employee-employer relationships for
employees and do not have negative impacts on overall employment, this is
different to the case when stabilisation goes hand in hand with lower overall
employment. Long-term implications of collective wage bargaining on labour
demand have recently been investigated by Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger
and Franz (1999) and Klotz et al. (1999) using sectoral data. These studies find
indications of insider-effects on wage setting with negative long-run effects on
employment. Our qualitative results based on firm-level data are in line with
these findings. Our results confirm the view that there is a trade-off between
stable long-run employer-employee relationships for insiders and the creation of
additional jobs in the short-run. Insider power creates specific barriers to new
jobs and positive demand shocks has to be higher for firms bound to collective
wage bargaining compared to other firms.
If the unification of five separate German services-related unions into one
single service-sector union is successful, then collective wage agreements
presumably will become more common in the services sector. More stable
employment relationships of the employed workers might be one consequence,
less enrolments in the face of demand positive fluctuations, may be another. It is
not straightforward from the current analysis, however, to forecast the results of
wage bargaining in the future with larger unions. If unions attach more weight
to employment instead of wages (Fitzenberger and Franz, 1999) then the
diffusion of collective wage bargaining might be positive for employment.
Future research efforts should be devoted to study differential effects of
collective wage agreements, work councils, employment protection rules and
economic factors which lead to labour market rigidities in more detail. The
focus should again be on the interplay of institutions and market forces on the
firm level.
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Appendix
Table A1: Distribution of the possible answers across alternative instruments to
adjust to demand changes
not at all
applied
applied sometimes
applied
Applied often applied # of obs
Life-long working hours
scheme
1996 60.8 13.2 12.5 9.1 4.5 530
1997 59.5 14.4 11.7 9.0 5.5 898
1998 60.2 13.0 11.7 9.6 5.6 984
1999 60.2 14.4 12.1 7.7 5.6 959
pooled 60.1 13.8 11.9 8.8 5.4 3,371
Overtime/short-time
1996 12.4 11.4 27.9 29.6 18.7 555
1997 13.9 14.2 22.2 28.2 16.5 920
1998 17.1 13.7 25.4 26.7 17.1 1,006
1999 18.0 15.1 22.4 27.4 17.1 976
pooled 15.8 13.9 25.4 27.7 17.2 3,457
Dismissals
1996 38.0 28.7 20.9 9.6 2.9 555
1997 41.2 26.8 20.9 7.9 3.2 919
1998 41.6 27.8 20.4 7.2 3.1 1,001
1999 49.4 24.2 16.8 7.3 2.3 969
pooled 43.1 26.6 19.6 7.8 2.9 3,444
Enrolments
1996 27.0 26.8 31.9 11.0 3.3 548
1997 24.1 26.3 31.3 12.9 5.4 923
1998 25.0 23.0 30.5 16.2 5.4 997
1999 22.8 25.9 30.3 14.5 6.6 967
pooled 24.4 25.3 30.9 14.0 5.4 3,435
Temporary employment contracts
1996 35.9 18.1 24.6 15.8 5.6 552
1997 32.0 18.4 22.4 17.3 9.9 934
1998 33.6 18.0 22.0 18.6 7.9 1,001
1999 36.9 17.4 20.1 17.1 8.5 973
pooled 34.5 18.0 22.0 17.4 8.2 3,460
Free-lance contractors
1996 38.1 14.9 18.7 17.6 10.8 557
1997 38.6 17.5 16.2 15.6 12.1 935
1998 41.4 15.7 16.9 16.0 10.1 1,001
1999 42.6 14.5 17.3 17.0 8.6 975
pooled 40.4 15.7 17.1 16.4 10.3 3,468
Price adjustments
1996 27.9 24.6 29.2 13.7 4.6 548
1997 33.4 22.6 27.8 12.8 3.4 921
1998 28.2 25.1 28.1 13.8 4.7 992
1999 29.7 26.1 26.6 13.6 4.1 963
pooled 30.0 24.6 27.8 13.5 4.2 3,424
Subcontracting
1996 25.8 21.9 24.7 17.6 10.1 567
1997 24.0 22.8 24.0 20.2 9.1 939
1998 30.5 22.7 23.1 15.3 8.4 1,003
1999 30.0 21.3 22.7 17.8 8.1 970
pooled 27.8 22.2 23.5 17.7 8.8 3,479
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables (pooled panel)
# of obs. Mean/Share Std. err. Type
Coll. wage agreements
COLLWAGE 1,244 0.3006 - 0/1
Demand changes
1,244 0.3529 - 0/1
1,244 0.1696 - 0/1
1,244 0.2797 - 0/1
1,244 0.2042 - 0/1
1,093 0.3056 - 0/1
1,093 0.2059 - 0/1
Wave dummies
Wave 11 1,244 0.1768 - 0/1
Wave 15 1,244 0.2838 - 0/1
Wave 23 1,244 0.3159 - 0/1
Firm size dummies
SIZE<5 1,244 0.0482 - 0/1
SIZE6-20 1,244 0.2331 - 0/1
SIZE50-100 1,244 0.1270 - 0/1
SIZE100-200 1,244 0.0932 - 0/1
SIZE>200 1,244 0.0860 - 0/1
Skill shares
SHARE
high
1,244 0.3363 0.3035 cont.
SHARElow 1,244 0.1558 0.2345 cont.
Bewildernment w/ dem. fluct.
BEWILDER+ 1,244 0.2492 - 0/1
BEWILDER++ 1,244 0.1198 - 0/1
East German firm
East Germany 1,244 0.3240 - 0/1
Sectoral dummies
Computer and rel act. 1,244 0.0991 - 0/1
Tax cons. 1,244 0.1188 - 0/1
Management cons. 1,244 0.0877 - 0/1
Architect. act. 1,244 0.0953 - 0/1
Techn. cons. 1,244 - 0/1
Advertising 1,244 0.0756 - 0/1
Renting of automobiles 1,244 0.0567 - 0/1
Renting of machines 1,244 0.0688 - 0/1
Cargo handling 1,244 0.1044 - 0/1
Sewage disposal 1,244 0.1271 - 0/1
Ä Dupt+1
Ä  Ddownt+1
Ä Dup
t
Ä Ddown
tÄ Dup
t-1
Ä Ddownt-1
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